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Kidney Allocation and the Limits of the Age
Discrimination Act
Thousands of people die waiting for a kidney transplant every year in the
United States.! Less well known, however, is that many people who do receive
kidneys from deceased donors gain only a few years of life, because they were
relatively old and in poor health to begin with.' Meanwhile, younger people
who receive kidneys from older decedents often outlive their new organs,
eventually returning to the waiting list for a second transplant.'
After years of planning and consultation, the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN), the government-chartered body
responsible for allocating cadaveric organs in the United States, has proposed a
new regime to address these misalignments and make better use of the scarce
supply of kidneys.4 The crux of the proposal, which was released for public
comment in September 2012, is straightforward. Rather than simply giving
kidneys to the patients who have been waiting the longest, the new system will
allocate the highest-quality kidneys to the people for whom a transplant
1. See Chapter III: Kidney and Pancreas Transplantation in the United States, 1999-2oo8: The
Changing Face of Living Donation, in 2009 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT: TRANSPLANT
DATA 1999-2008, at 3 (2009), http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_reports/current
/chapterjiii-forprint.pdf.
2. See R.A. Wolfe et al., Calculating Life Years from Transplant (LYFT): Methods for Kidney and
Kidney-Pancreas Candidates, 8 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 997, 1007-o8 & fig.io (2008)
(estimating life-years from transplant by age and diabetes status).
3. See Alan B. Leichtman, Keith P. McCullough & Robert A. Wolfe, Improving the Allocation
System for Deceased-Donor Kidneys, 364 NEwENG.J. MED. 1287, 1288 (2011).
4. Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, Proposal To Substantially Revise
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promises the most years of additional life.' The OPTN's Kidney
Transplantation Committee estimates that this new system of "longevity
matching" will wring an extra 8,380 years of life out of the nation's supply of
cadaveric kidneys each year.6
Critics have charged the plan with age discrimination, since it will
deliberately allocate high-quality kidneys to younger candidates at the expense
of older candidates with equal or greater medical need.' These allegations raise
significant legal and moral questions, and the debate they have sparked offers a
revealing vantage point on the ways discrimination is conceptualized within
and outside the law.
As a constitutional matter, age discrimination is insulated from judicial
scrutiny by the Supreme Court's longstanding conclusion that the aged do not
constitute a "suspect class." 8  Federally funded programs, however, are
expressly forbidden from engaging in age discrimination by the Age
s. Under the proposed system, transplant candidates will be assigned "estimated post
transplant survival" (EPTS) scores, calculated on the basis of age, dialysis time, prior
transplant history, and diabetes status; and donated kidneys will be assigned "kidney donor
profile index" (KDPI) scores that measure organ quality on the basis of the donor's age,
height, weight, ethnicity, and other medical characteristics. See id. at 10-12. The quintile of
adult candidates with the best EPTS scores will receive priority for the quintile of donor
kidneys with the best KDPI scores. Id. at 7. "If longevity matching proves to be a successful
approach for kidney allocation," however, "future policy iterations could expand the number
of kidneys and candidates which participate." Id. at 12. In addition, although the
top-quintile rule will apply only to adult candidates, pediatric candidates -who presently
hold priority for kidneys from donors younger than thirty-five-will continue to hold
priority for organs that satisfy a KDPI threshold calibrated to "maintain the same level of
access that is experienced under the current system." Id. at 20.
6. Id. at 32.
7. See Rob Stein, Who's Next in Line for A Kidney Transplant? The Answer Is Changing, NPR,
(Sept. 20, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2o12/o9/2o/161475405/whos
-next-in-line-for-a-transplant-the-answer-is-changing (recounting criticism). The debate
over longevity matching was sparked by an earlier "concept document" published in 2011
and discussed below. For contributions to that discussion, see, for example, J.S. Gill, An
Alternative Kidney Allocation Algorithm: Is It Better, and by What Yardstick?, 12 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1973, 1973-74 (2012); K. Ladin & D.W. Hanto, Rational Rationing or
Discrimination: Balancing Equity and Efficiency Considerations in Kidney Allocation, 11 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2317, 2318 (2011); L.F. Ross et al., Equal Opportunity Supplemented by Fair
Innings: Equity and Efficiency in Allocating Deceased Donor Kidneys, 12 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 2115 (2012); and Lainie Friedman Ross & J. Richard Thistlethwaite,
Should Age Be a Factor in the Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys?, 25 SEMINARS DIALYSIS 1
(2012).
8. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
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Discrimination Act (ADA) of 1975.9 Although this statute "has seldom been
cited or litigated,""o there is little question that the organ transplantation
network is subject to its requirements. Indeed, federal officials warned that an
earlier version of the OPTN proposal, which would have directly matched
candidates with organs of comparable age, could violate the ADA." The OPTN
responded by scrapping the draft plan, acknowledging that it "may be
perceived as age discrimination."" Vhile the new proposal does away with
direct pairing of donors and recipients by age, it continues to take account of
age in calculating a patient's "estimated post transplant survival" score, which
in turn determines her access to high-quality kidneys. Some have called for
Congress to intervene and exempt the new plan from the ADA altogether if
necessary to ensure its legality."
In Part I of this Comment, I consider whether this new scheme violates the
ADA. This analysis traverses largely uncharted terrain, interpreting a statute
that "has been virtually forgotten since its enactment."" My conclusions are
correspondingly tentative. What is clear, however, is the narrow conception of
wrongful discrimination that animates the law. In essence, the ADA asks how
closely a proposed age-based means fits a program's ends, deeming age
classifications impermissibly discriminatory if the fit is too loose.
In Part II, I explore a symbolic dimension to discrimination claims that the
ADA therefore fails to squarely confront. As recent scholarship has recognized,
to claim that a practice is wrongfully discriminatory is often not to allege that it
is instrumentally irrational, but to assert that its public meaning denigrates the
equal worth of some persons. Disputes over discriminatory rationing are thus
not only about forswearing arbitrary inferences, as the ADA imagines, or about
equitable distribution, as many bioethicists seem to suppose, but are also a site
of contestation over how to publicly respect people as equals. Considering the
new OPTN proposal from this perspective, I argue, sheds valuable light on the
concerns it has provoked.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (20o6).
1o. Peter H. Schuck, The Golden Age ofAging, and Its Discontents, 18 ELDER L.J. 25, 26 (2010).
ii. See Proposal, supra note 4, at 3, 7.
12. Id. at 7.
13. See supra note 5.
14. See Editorial, Discarded Kidneys, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com
/2ol2/o9/25/opiniorVdiscarded-kidneys.html.
15. Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact of the Federal Age
Discrimination Act on the "Hidden" Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 993,
994-95 (1988).
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Finally, I suggest that the interplay between legal and moral conceptions of
discrimination in this unfolding debate may exemplify a phenomenon of
broader significance. In codifying our normative commitments, legal categories
also shape the terms on which we understand and debate them. The legal
regime governing claims of age discrimination therefore threatens to cut short
an important conversation about what forms of age-based differential
treatment are acceptable, not only as instrumentally rational, but as consistent
with our commitment to affirming the equal worth of persons.
1. IS THE PROPOSED SYSTEM CONSISTENT WITH THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION ACT?
A. The Statutory Scheme
The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 provides that "no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 6 This sweeping prohibition
applies to the hundreds of transplant centers that comprise the OPTN." The
ADA is subject to three broad exceptions, however, which "crystallize the
dearth of advantage provided by this law."
First, the statute expressly disfavors disparate impact claims, providing that
classifications on the basis of "reasonable factors other than age" cannot
constitute age discrimination. 9 Second, certain age-based distinctions are
permitted if the program at issue is "established under authority of any law"
16. 42 U.S.C. § 61o2 (20o6).
17. See Report to the Board of Directors, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK
3 (Nov. 14-15, 2011), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/CommitteeReports/board-main
jKidneyTransplantationCommittee 11_17_2011_17_29.pdf [hereinafter Report] (noting that
"transplant centers may be at risk of being sued" under the ADA if an impermissible
algorithm is used); cf Silver, supra note 15, at 1057 ("There seems to be little doubt that a
hospital that participates in Medicare or receives reimbursement under a state Medicaid
program receives federal financial assistance." (footnotes omitted)). For a list of transplant
centers in the OPTN, see Transplant Centers, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/members/search.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
is. George J. Alexander, Schucking Off the Rights of the Aged: Congressional Ambivalence and the
Exceptions to the Age Discrimination Act of0975, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1oo9, 1oo9 (1981).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 610 3 (b)(1)(B); cf Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-43 (2005)(construing a parallel provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to create a
defense against disparate impact claims where the nonage factor is reasonable).
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that draws the distinctions itself.2 o And third, federally funded programs may
distinguish on the basis of age if "such action reasonably takes into account age
as a factor necessary to the normal operation or the achievement of any
statutory objective of such program or activity.""
Since the proposed longevity-matching scheme would differentiate among
transplant candidates in part on the basis of age itself, rather than merely on
the basis of some other correlated trait, the exception for use of "reasonable
factors other than age" is inapposite here. The exception for age distinctions
established by "any law" comes closer, but it has been construed to cover only
age distinctions drawn by statutes,22 and the statute authorizing the organ
transplantation network does not draw any such distinctions." Consequently,
the legality of the longevity-matching proposal turns on the question posed by
the third exception: whether the proposal "takes into account age as a factor
necessary" either to the "normal operation" of the organ transplantation
program or to "the achievement of any [of its] statutory objective[s]."
B. Does Longevity Matching Fall Within the Exception?
Although courts have almost never interpreted and applied this provision
of the ADA,' the statutory categories can be construed in light of the
implementing regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS).2 s These regulations were expressly commissioned by
20. 42 U.S.C. 5 610 3 (b)(2); see also Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 60 n.170 (1979) (clarifying the relevant statutory
language).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 61o3(b)(i) (A).
22. See 45 C.F.R. S 90. 3 (b)(1) (2012).
23. See National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
24. The eighteen reported ADA cases are cataloged in 1 JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET AL., ELDERLAW
§ 3:11 (2d ed. Supp. 2012). Within this small set, most claims are dismissed on threshold
grounds -for example, because of the plaintiff's failure to exhaust available remedies, or
because the defendant is not covered by the Act. However, there has been some occasional,
cursory analysis of the reach of the statutory prohibition. For example, one district court has
concluded that the NCAA rule limiting collegiate eligibility after age twenty
"probabl[y] ... does not amount to age-discrimination under the statute," because "in this
context, age is simply a shorthand approximation of physical maturity." Butts v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 6oo F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1984), affd, 751 F.2d 609 (3 d Cir.
1984).
25. Congress directed HHS (then the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) to issue
government-wide regulations for implementing the ADA and also instructed
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the statute and are therefore entitled to "[g]reat deference.",,6 Even with the
benefit of the regulations, however, the import of the ADA's exception for
distinctions necessary to a program's "normal operation" or "statutory
objective [s]" remains somewhat opaque.
Specifically, according to the regulations, an otherwise prohibited action is
permitted if age is used as a reasonable "measure or approximation" of some
other characteristic that is "impractical to measure directly on an individual
basis" but nonetheless necessary to approximate "in order for the normal
operation of the program or activity to continue, or to achieve any statutory
objective of the program or activity."2 7 "Normal operation," the regulations
explain, "means the operation of a program or activity without significant
changes that would impair its ability to meet its objectives."" A "statutory
objective," by contrast, is any purpose that is "expressly stated" in a statute. 9
The applicability of the exception to the longevity-matching scheme can
thus be analyzed in two stages. The first concerns the degree of fit between the
age classification and some given end-here, estimating post-transplant
longevity. Second, assuming a sufficiently close fit between ends and means,
age-based differentiation is permitted if it is necessary to achieve an explicit
statutory objective or if foregoing it would represent a significant change to the
program that frustrates its objectives.
As for the first stage, it is apparently true that various medical risks that
bear on future life expectancy "can be reasonably measured or approximated by
the use of age," and it may indeed be impractical to assess these risks without
taking account of age. An HHS representative thus advised the OPTN policy
committee that the use of age in estimating post-transplant survival "was not
of concern because the evidence has shown that age is a suitable proxy for
variables such as cardiovascular disease which are not available in the OPTN
dataset."3o
individual departments -including HHS-to issue agency-specific regulations consistent
with these general regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (2006); see 45 C.F.R. 5 9o (2012)
(government-wide regulations); id. § 91 (2012) (HHS-specific regulations).
26. NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 317 (D. Del. 1980), affd, 657 F.2d
1322 ( 3d Cit. 1981).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 91-13 (2012).
28. Id. § 91.12(a).
2g. Id. § 91.12(b).
30. Report, supra note 17, at 3.
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Supposing that is true -and that the OPTN dataset could not readily be
expanded to incorporate such variables" - the question remains whether
estimating post-transplant survival is necessary to the program's normal
operation or to achieving its statutory objectives. The fit between longevity
matching and the statutory objectives of the program is unclear, however. The
National Organ Transplant Act directs the OPTN to "assist organ procurement
organizations in the nationwide distribution of organs equitably among
transplant patients,"" and mandates that the component organizations must
"have a system to allocate donated organs equitably among transplant patients
according to established medical criteria."" These broad instructions to allocate
organs "equitably" do not say whether longevity matching is essential to that
purpose or inconsistent with it.
A stronger case for an exception can be made under the "normal operation"
prong of the test. According to the HHS regulations governing the OPTN, its
allocation policies "[s]hall seek to achieve the best use of donated organs,"'
and must be designed not only to "promote patient access to transplantation,"s
but also to "avoid wasting organs" and "to avoid futile transplants."" A task
force commissioned by Congress in chartering the OPTN similarly reported
that "[t] he prevailing ethos and practice are to allocate organs to the recipient
who will live the longest with the highest quality of life."37 It is therefore at
least plausible that foregoing longevity matching would impair the program's
objectives and hence interfere with its "normal operation" within the meaning
of the ADA.
Interestingly, when HHS promulgated the government-wide regulations
for the ADA, its preamble analyzed a somewhat analogous case by way of
example." A medical school might turn away applicants ages thirty-five and
3. The proposal explains that "[w]hile other factors, such as cardiovascular health, affect
survival, an objective metric is not currently available in the OPTN database. As the field of
transplantation advances, study of additional factors could lead to their incorporation into
the dataset and ultimately into allocation policy." Proposal, supra note 4, at 12.
32. 42 U.S.C. 5 27 4 (b)(2)(D) (20o6).
33. Id. S 273 (b) (3) (E).-
34. 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(2) (2012).
3s. Id. § 121.8 (a) (5).
36. Id.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 87 (1986)
[hereinafter ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION]. But see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the report's recommendations about age-based rationing in particular).
38. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,773-74 (June 12, 1979).
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older, the agency explained, and claim that its objective was "the teaching of
qualified medical students who, upon graduation, will practice as long as
possible."3 In its model analysis, HHS conceded that age "may be a reasonable
measure" of "longevity of practice," and that it "may be impractical" to
measure this property directly.4o Nonetheless, it explained, the program could
not qualify for the "normal operation" exception because "the basic objectives
of the medical school involve training competent and qualified medical school
graduates."4' "The 'normal operation' exception is not intended to permit a
recipient to use broad notions of efficiency or cost-benefit analysis to justify
exclusion from a program on the basis of age."4
Does this mean that age-based longevity matching in organ allocation is
impermissible as well, since it too is an obvious effort to promote efficiency
through a kind of cost-benefit analysis? The preamble takes a more equivocal
view, explaining later on that an "explicit age distinction . . . cannot be
disqualified or justified because it reflects a cost-benefit consideration."43
Rather, the distinction must rise or fall with the letter of the "normal
operation" test.44 This is not very helpful guidance, since in the lead example of
why something would fail that test, the agency's conclusion appears to rest on
the program's use of cost-benefit analysis; nothing else is said to explain why
the medical school has misunderstood its own objectives. In any case, because a
mandate to achieve the "best use" of organs and to avoid "wasting" them is
explicit in the regulations governing the OPTN, a plausible case can be made
that this sort of rationing is, unlike in the medical school case, an integral part
of the program's scheme of objectives -and hence important to its "normal
operation" within the meaning of the regulations and the statute.
Finally, we might seek interpretive guidance in the parallel between the
language of the ADA's "normal operation" exception and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's exception for "bona fide occupational
qualifications" (BFOQs).4 ' The Supreme Court has described the BFOQ
39. Id. at 33,773.





45. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 610 3(b)(1) (20o6) (permitting age discrimination if "such action
reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation ... of such
program or activity"), with 29 U.S.C. § 62 3(f)(1) (20o6) (permitting age discrimination
" where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business").
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exception as "an extremely narrow" one,' and some have argued that the
ADA's similarly worded "normal operation" provision should therefore also be
given limited scope.47 This comparison is of limited use, however. The Court's
reading of the BFOQ exception relied heavily on the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's view that the provision permitted only age
distinctions "reasonably necessary to the essence of the business."** By contrast,
as we have seen, HHS reads the ADA's exception to cover classifications that
are necessary not to the essence of a program, but merely to its "normal
operation," defined as its operation "without significant changes that would
impair its ability to meet its objectives."4 9 This is a more permissive standard;
it evidently refuses to ask funding recipients to make large changes that would
compromise their objectives in order to avoid age classifications. Moreover,
functional differences between the two statutes warn against imputing
equivalent meanings to the exceptions as well.so Whereas the viability of the
BFOQdefense in employment cases often turns on whether older candidates
can perform the job "safely and efficiently,"" for instance, the scheme of
objectives that informs the targeting of public programs such as the organ
transplantation network is plainly different and likely more complex.s2
C. The Puzzle ofDirect Age Matching
The central question posed by the ADA, this analysis suggests, is whether a
proposed age-based differentiation serves as a rational proxy for some other
trait and is instrumental to furthering a program's objectives. I have suggested
that a colorable case can be made that longevity matching in organ allocation
satisfies this test, since part of the point of the program is to make the best use
of donated organs - with an evident concern for efficiency - and prioritizing on
the basis of age arguably furthers that goal. Supposing that is correct, however,
it remains something of a mystery why HHS's Office of Civil Rights objected
to a draft proposal that would have directly matched donated organs with
candidates of comparable age, while apparently acquiescing in a scheme that
46. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 334 (1977)).
47. See Silver, supra note 15, at 1036-41.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (2012) (emphasis added); see Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412, 46.
49. 45 C.F.R. § 91.12 (2012).
50. See Schuck, supra note 20, at 68-70.
51. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414.
52. See Schuck, supra note 20, at 68-69.
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uses age as a factor in estimating post-transplant survival, which in turn is used
to prioritize candidates.
Under the rejected direct-matching scheme, most kidneys would have been
allocated with a preference for candidates within fifteen years of the deceased
donor's age.s3 In a report to its Board of Directors, however, the OPTN's
Kidney Transplantation Committee related the government's advice that,
although "age may be used if it is a proxy for medical variables," "the use of age
matching within is years appeared to be arbitrary in that candidates who are
sixteen years older or younger than a donor are not substantially clinically
different than those who have 14 years of age difference."" By contrast, the use
of age as one factor in calculating post-transplant longevity was thought to be
unproblematic because, as noted above, "evidence has shown that age is a
suitable proxy for variables such as cardiovascular disease which are not
available in the OPTN dataset."s
Two possible interpretations of this analysis suggest themselves. One is
that the fit between age alone and longevity is simply not good enough to
qualify as a reasonable proxy under the ADA-dooming the proposal at the
first of the two stages identified above. By contrast, the new proposal's
compound estimate of estimated post-transplant survival (EPTS)-which
takes account of not only age, but also length of time on dialysis, prior
transplant history, and diabetes statuss6 - is presumably much more accurate.
This may be true, but it does not resolve the puzzle. After all, even under
the revised plan, there will still be candidates who would have qualified for a
better kidney if they had been only one year younger, and it will presumably
still be impossible to show that they are "substantially clinically different" from
the marginally younger candidates who take their places. If that constitutes
impermissible arbitrariness in the context of direct age matching, why should
encasing age in a compound measure of longevity redress, or even mitigate, the
concern? Moreover, supposing that the compound EPTS score is a better
predictor of longevity than age alone, this does little to justify taking account of
age in calculating EPTS. To the extent that EPTS is more accurate than age as a
predictor of longevity, it is precisely because of the weight that EPTS places on
53. See Concepts for Kidney Allocation, ORGAN PRocuREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK 5 (Feb. 16, 2011), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/SharedContentDocuments
/KidneyConceptDocument.pdf.
s4. See Report, supra note 17, at 3.
ss. Id.
s6. See Proposal, supra note 4, at 12.
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factors other than age. But it is the marginal contribution of age itself that
should be scrutinized under the ADA.'
A second, more critical explanation of the discrepant judgments therefore
warrants consideration. Under either scheme, age is being used as a measure of
life expectancy, and under either scheme, this will appear to be arbitrary at the
margins. But when age is cast as a proxy for conditions such as heart disease,
and incorporated alongside other paradigmatically medical criteria such as
diabetes status, the inference from years lived to years left is attenuated and
"medicalized" in a way that may invite greater deference. In other words, the
indirect longevity-matching scheme can more easily be understood to be
making the essentially medical judgments that fall within the "normal
operation" of the OPTN, and which, indeed, might be seen as part and parcel
of its statutory mandate to allocate organs in accordance with "established
medical criteria."58
If this explanation is correct, it appears to represent an unfortunate
triumph of form over substance. Under both proposals, age would function as
a measure of life expectancy-and in both cases, the mechanism of this
relationship is obviously that many health risks mount with age. It is not clear
why professing to use age only to estimate those health risks, rather than to
estimate longevity, should affect the legality of the plan. Moreover, in both
cases, the consideration of age is permissible only if it is important to
furthering the program's objectives. The question whether longevity matching
itself is necessary to achieving the program's purposes is therefore unavoidable
under either approach; it is not sufficient to say that age-based differentiation
is permissible so long as age is merely "a proxy for medical variables.""
II. BEYOND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT
This analysis confirms that the legality of the OPTN plan under the ADA
poses difficult questions concerning both the fit between age and longevity and
the relevance of longevity matching itself to the OPTN's purposes. But while
the answers to these questions are somewhat uncertain, the questions
57. This last argument is subject to a narrow caveat: the formula for calculating EPTS takes
account of both age alone and an interaction variable for age and diabetes status. See
Proposal, supra note 4, at 12 (specifying the EPTS formula). Some fraction of the increased
accuracy of EPTS relative to age alone could therefore be due to the more nuanced way in
which EPTS takes account of age, as opposed to exclusively the nonage factors it
encompasses.
58. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
59. Report, supra note 17, at 3.
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themselves are not. As we have seen, something is wrongfully discriminatory,
according to the ADA, if it lacks the virtue of fit -that is, if the age-based
differentiation at issue is insufficiently relevant or important to what the
program is trying to accomplish.
The ADA is thus structured to root out irrational, prejudiced exclusions of
classes of people on the basis of age. That reflects the thrust of the law's
purpose. As the House Committee Report explained:
Non-involvement of older persons is traceable time and again, not to
their own desires, but to a determination by the leaders of many
institutions in our society to discriminate against persons as workers
and as volunteers solely because they have reached a given age. They
refuse to consider the merits of each case. In so doing they reflect by
their deeds a deep-seated prejudice against the elderly.o
The law therefore targets arbitrary age classifications that reflect a misguided
refusal to assess individual cases -while permitting age categories that actually
make a significant contribution to furthering a program's purposes.
This way of understanding the wrong of discrimination- as a form of
wrongful arbitrariness -is deeply rooted in the law and in legal theory.6' It also
has currency among physicians and bioethicists who employ the Institute of
Medicine's definition of discrimination as disparate treatment on the basis of
"irrelevant traits. , 62 Discrimination claims are not only about challenging
arbitrariness, however, but also about insisting on the public recognition of
people's equal worth and dignity.
As scholars and jurists have often recognized, acts that classify along
socially salient lines are troubling in part because they risk demeaning or
denigrating the equal moral standing of those who are disfavored."
"Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm," the Supreme
Court has explained, threatening the right "to be treated with equal dignity and
6o. H.R. REP. No. 94-67, at 15 (1975).
61. For critical discussion of the idea of discrimination as arbitrariness, see MAT CAVANAGH,
AGAINST EQUAuTY OF OPPORTUNITY 156 (2002); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS
DIscIMINATION WRONG? 114-37 (2008); and Patrick S. Shin, The Substantive Principle of
Equal Treatment, 15 LEGAL THEORY 149, 152-54 (2009).
62. See Ladin & Hanto, supra note 7, at 2320.
63. For recent scholarship elaborating this insight, see, for example, HELLMAN, supra note 61;
and Shin, supra note 61, at 162.
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respect.",6  Similarly, as Charles Black argued in his influential defense of
Brown v. Board of Education, the moral force of the Court's holding turned on
"the fact that the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a
position of walled-off inferiority."s6 More broadly, as Charles Taylor writes,
"our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, . . . and so a person
or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or
society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or
contemptible picture of themselves."66
The danger that classification will take on a social meaning of contempt for
a class of people, though perhaps implicit in all line drawing, is especially acute
when the action involves deciding how to value people's lives. Expressly
disfavoring older transplant candidates thus raises serious concerns that are not
reducible to the claim that the scheme is unduly arbitrary or lacking in means-
ends rationality. Of course, the longevity-matching proposal does not actually
rest on the judgment that some people are of lesser worth, or entitled to lesser
respect, than others. It only supposes that some people's lives are more worth
saving, for the simple reason that there is more life there to be saved." But this
distinction - between a person's worth and the worth of saving her life - is very
thin indeed. It would not be unreasonable to worry that, in consigning the
aged to a lower-priority class for access to lifesaving treatment, we risk
conveying and fostering the attitude that they are simply of lesser value as
persons.
Viewed in this way, the concern that the new proposal discriminates
against older people is of a piece with other recent controversies surrounding
the valuation of life and the rationing of resources, which have often invited
struggles over dignity and respect rather than simple rationality or fairness. For
64. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); cf Heckler v. Mathews, 465
U.S. 728, 739 (1984) (suggesting that "discrimination itself' can cause serious injury "by
stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ... less worthy participants in the political
community").
65. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960)
(emphasis added); cf HELLMAN, supra note 61, at 54-55 (crediting Black's article as the
"inspiration" for Hellman's own view, which assesses discriminatory acts in terms of the
meanings they express).
66. Charles Taylor, The Politics ofRecognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 254 (1986) (identifying antidiscrimination rights as a means to "foster a public
culture which enables people to take pride in their identity" in various groups).
67. For a general defense of such medical rationing on the basis of quality-adjusted life-years,
see PETER H. SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, TARGETING IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS:
AVOIDING BAD BETS, REMOVING BAD APPLES 50-59 (20o6).
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example, in two of its economic analyses in 2002, the EPA treated saving
someone more than seventy years old as worth about two-fifths less than the
standard statistical life. 8 Outraged seniors protested at an EPA meeting
wearing price tags that read "Seniors on Sale, 37% Off,"69 and critics pilloried
the EPA's move as "dropping the value on human beings as they age" and
implying that some people are "cheap as dirt."70 In short, the suggestion that
some people's lives were less worth saving was understandably heard to say
that the people themselves were worth less.
Approaching the valuation of life in terms of the obligation not to show
disrespect for people's equal worth thus renders worries about age
discrimination in the new kidney regime both more understandable and more
potent. As in the EPA case, unease about the OPTN's new policy is better seen
not simply as a reaction to an irrational stereotype of older people as nearer to
death - a generalization that few would deny - but rather as taking offense at
the idea that some people are worth more than others.
This symbolic dimension of the problem is distinct not only from the
concerns of the ADA, but also from the questions of distributive justice or
equity that have dominated discussion of longevity matching among
bioethicists.7 ' The central dispute in that emerging literature concerns whether
allocating kidneys on the basis of expected longevity is unfair to older
candidates, or rather justified by the objective of securing a reasonable lifespan
to all patients, itself a possible requirement of fairness.72 Whatever the
resolution of that question of distributive justice, however, we should also
68. See Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo3/o/o8/us/epa-drops-age-based
-cost-studies.html.
6g. John J. Fialka, Balancing Act: Lives vs. Regulations: 'Senior Death Discount' Riles Critics but
OMB Favors Analyses That Weigh Life Expectancy, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2003, at A4.
70. Robert Trigaux, An Ominous New Meaning for Senior Discount, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 19, 2003, http://www.sptimes.con/2oo3/o5/19/news-pf/Colunms/Anominousnew
meanin.shtml.
71. See, e.g., Ladin & Hanto, supra note 7, at 2318 (approaching kidney allocation as a matter of
"balancing equity and efficiency"); Ross & Thistlethwaite, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that
transplant candidates are entitled to an equal chance of obtaining a kidney, but not a kidney
of equal longevity); see also Ross et al., supra note 7 (defending an alternative proposal on
the ground that it better balances efficiency and equity).
72. For a short summary of this debate, see Ladin & Hanto, supra note 7, at 2318. On the broader
question of distributive justice between generations, see NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY
PARENTS' KEEPER?: AN ESSAY ON JUSTICE BETWEEN THE YOUNG AND THE OLD (1988); and
Dennis McKerlie, Justice Between the Young and the Old, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 152 (2002).
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interrogate the meaning of disfavoring older candidates and the attitudes that it
may model and engender.
Indeed, the 1986 Task Force Report that informed the organization of the
OPTN appears to have anticipated such concerns. The report noted that
"assigning priority to younger candidates" could be justified by "medical
utility," since age serves "as a predictor of . . . a longer period of survival after
transplantation."" The task force urged "utmost caution" about the use of age,
however, emphasizing the importance of employing "objective medical criteria"
that are "well recognized and widely accepted" in order to ensure that "medical
judgments are reflected rather than judgments of social worth. "
Such concerns are sensitive to the social context in which classifications
take place. The new longevity-matching proposal must therefore be
understood against a backdrop of entrenched stereotypes that portray older
people as "nagging, irritable, decrepit, cranky, weak, feebleminded, verbose,
and cognitively deficient," as well as "asexual, impotent, useless, and ugly.""7
State-sanctioned medical rationing that expressly disfavors older people is
troubling because of the real risk that it will be understood to reflect judgments
of comparative worth, and that it will thereby lend renewed credibility to these
demeaning attitudes toward older people. In so doing, the scheme could also
undermine public confidence in the neutrality of the organ network-a vital
resource in a regime that relies on voluntary participation.
Although this dimension of age-based differential treatment is neglected by
the ADA, it may point toward another explanation for the government's
puzzling opposition to only direct age matching. I suggested above that
distinguishing between direct and indirect age matching appears to be an odd
formalism, exhibiting heightened deference to nominally "medical"
judgments.7 More charitably, however, it could reflect sensitivity to the social
meaning of age-classifying policy choices, and a corresponding insistence that
longevity matching be accomplished by mechanisms whose meanings are less
corrosive of solidarity or mutual respect.'
In other words, the government's insistence that age be treated as a proxy
for particular health conditions, used only as one part of computing a
73. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 37, at 90.
74. Id. at 90-91-
75. Robert McCann & Howard Giles, Ageism in the Workplace: A Communication Perspective, in
AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 163, 166 (Todd D. Nelson
ed., 2002).
76. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
77. I am grateful to Dov Fox for suggesting this interpretation of the discrepancy.
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compound longevity estimate, might be justified by concerns similar to those
expressed in the Task Force Report-that allocation criteria should be limited
to factors that are "widely accepted" as "objective medical criteria," precisely in
order to avoid exhibiting "judgments of social worth."'" Thus, as Paul Mishkin
wrote of affirmative action programs that afford "pluses" but avoid quotas,
"[e]ven when the net operative results may be the same, the use of
euphemisms may serve valuable purposes" in shaping "public reactions" to a
regime of differential treatment.79
Even if this is the implicit aim of the government's compromise, of course,
it is an open question how far it succeeds. More fundamentally, it is significant
that these concerns have no place within the formal legal conception of
wrongful discrimination elaborated by the ADA. The expressive content of the
proposed rule might be scrutinized if it were subject to meaningful review
under the Equal Protection Clause, for, arguably at least, "[s]ymbolism and
social meaning have always shaped the law of equal protection."so But, as I
noted at the outset, that possibility is effectively foreclosed by the Supreme
Court's conclusion that the aged do not constitute a "suspect class." 8' Some of
the most fundamental questions about whether the new scheme wrongfully
discriminates against older people are therefore left to the discretion of the
agencies developing the plan -as well as to a public reckoning over its benefits
and its felt significance, outside the courts.
78. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 37, at 91.
79. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the
Constitutionality ofAffirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 927-28 (1983); see also Elizabeth
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1540 (2ooo) ("Form is not just about form for formalism's sake. Different
means of pursuing affirmative action can express different understandings about the
appropriate role of race in public life."); cf Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative
Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1195, 1236 (2002) (observing that, in racial
redistricting cases, "[t]he Court prefers that, when states consider race, their actions are
ambiguous enough to be explained in other ways").
8o. Richard Primus, The Future ofDisparate Impact, io8 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1347 (2olo); see also
Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension ofEqual Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000)
(arguing that equal protection analysis should turn on "the meaning or expressive content of
the law or policy at issue").
81. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); see also Nina A. Kohn,
Rethinking the Constitutionality ofAge Discrimination: A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus,
44 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 213 (2010) (summarizing and criticizing this doctrine).
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CONCLUSION
There is an irony to this result. The ADA incorporated capacious exceptions
to its prohibition on discrimination in the recognition that, whereas race-based
distinctions in access to federally assisted programs are necessarily "arbitrary,"
"age may often be a reasonable distinction for these purposes." " The regime
therefore defers significantly to the ordinary political process -permitting age
distinctions that are either authorized by law or instrumentally important to
achieving the objectives of programs that have secured federal funding. The
Supreme Court invoked a similar logic of deference in holding that the aged do
not constitute a "suspect class," explaining that they do not require the
"extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process" that strict
scrutiny entails.
The irony is that, in codifying a narrow legal understanding of what
constitutes wrongful age discrimination, the law inevitably exerts a pull on the
democratic processes to which it purports to defer. The OPTN thus takes itself
to have redressed the concern that its plan "may be perceived as age
discrimination" by eschewing the particular form of differentiation that,
according to "legal experts," risked infringing the ADA-even though the task
force that organized the network long ago raised serious concerns about the use
of age classifications that had nothing to do with the ADA.1 Popular
discussion of the plan during the public comment period has likewise been
shaped by the constitutional premise that age classifications, if instrumentally
rational, are permissible. Thus, in a telling local news segment, an anchor lays
out the new longevity-matching proposal, raises the concern that it mistreats
older transplant candidates, and then turns to an attorney to explain to viewers
whether "there's any potential for age discrimination in this.""s The answer,
she explains, is that there is not, because "age is not a suspect class."
The interplay between legal and moral conceptions of discrimination in the
unfolding debate over the OPTN kidney proposal thus exemplifies a
phenomenon of broader significance. When a legal regime embraces and
82. H.R. REP. No. 94-670, at 56 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
83. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
84. ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 37, at go; Proposal, supra note 4, at 7.
85. Proposed Kidney Policy: Is It Age Discrimination? (WFMY CBS NEWS 2 (Greensboro,
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institutionalizes part, but less than all, of a preexisting normative concept, a
conceptual misalignment results. Such misalignments can effect a kind of
normative displacement- inviting moral questions to be recast as legal ones,
only to meet them with too-easy and potentially misleading answers. In this
case, I have argued, the longevity-matching proposal is likely legal under the
ADA, and immune from review under current equal protection law. But
equally important is that these regimes create a legally cognizable wrong of
discrimination that captures only a fraction of the underlying moral costs of
discriminatory action. The proposed plan should be assessed not only in terms
of its instrumental rationality, but also in light of the social meaning of treating
older people's lives as less worth saving. Its justifiability therefore turns in
part on questions that the operative legal frameworks may be ill suited to
answer - or, for that matter, to ask.
BENJAMIN EIDELSON
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